Introduction
The introduction of new forms of competition and management into Public Health Services in the U.K. and Sweden have implied a need to reform management information systems (MIS), particularly in the areas of costing and performance measurement (PM). The introduction of purchaser-provider splits, with the aim of fostering price competition among service providers via cost efficiency, has necessitated improved service product costing systems in provider organizations and has been accompanied by an increased focus on such performance indicators as waiting times. This paper contends that most of what has been written about the new public health services in the two countries has ignored the fact that providers are service operations, hence improvements in cost and other performance dimensions can only be achieved if information systems cater for the needs of operating employees, the contrasting control needs of top management within service providers, and management at regional and national levels. The paper compares experiences in the U.K. and Sweden by conducting 'gap analyses' using the Results and Determinants Framework (RDF) for Performance Measurement in Service Businesses to show areas where information provision could be improved.
In what follows we first make a case for viewing the compilation and use of P M and costing information in an information management (IM) perspective, both generally and specifically in Public Health Services (PHSs). This will take a service operations viewpoint, stressing the need to link strategy and operations in health services. Second, we give some background to the changes that have taken place in PHSs in the U.K. and Sweden. Third, we present the Results and Determinants Framework (RDF) for P M in Service Businesses by Fitzgerald et al. (1991) ) and argue that it may be adapted for use within PHSs alongside updated costing systems. Fourth, we introduce our case studies from the U.K. and Sweden and use the RDF to conduct 'gap analyses' to highlight areas where existing performance information provision seems inadequate. Finally, we draw some tentative conclusions about the deficiencies of present information provision in PHSs, which will have implications for the future.
PM and costing in an IM context
Much of the criticism of traditional financial performance measurement and monitoring stems from the exclusion of non-financial dimensions of performance. Emmanuel et al. (1990) argue that organizational success is a multi-dimensional concept whose aspects both change over time and between one individual or group in the organization and another. For example, while patients are naturally concerned with medical outcomes, they may only feel competent to comment on the process with which they are handled (e.g. waiting times, both before and after they enter the service delivery process). Clinical staff, however, may be more concerned with measures of medical outcomes (e.g. reinfection rates) and administrative staff with measures of outputs (e.g. number of patients handled, bed occupancy, financial return achieved, and so on). In order to achieve satisfactory levels of performance in each of these aspects, control and co-ordination of a variety of activities, carried out by various organizational groups, is necessary. Turney and Anderson (1989) argue that accounting has largely failed to adapt to the new competitive environment where continuous improvement in the design, manufacturing and marketing of a product (or service) are key requirements of success. PHSs in the U.K. and Sweden therefore need to ensure that the greater emphasis on financial performance measures, which goes against the trend in the private sector, does not drive out other dimensions of organizational performance.
Within PHSs the need for measures across multiple dimensions is emphasized by the existence of stakeholders with sometimes conflicting and/or overlapping interests, with some stakeholders falling into more than one classification: for example, there is a separation between those who consume health services (patients), those who ultimately pay for them (taxpayers), those who purchase them on the public's behalf (in the U.K., DHAs and fundholding GPs) and those who provide them (e.g. National Health Service Hospital Trusts).
In response to the growing dissatisfaction with traditional performance measurement systems (PMSs), a number of multidimensional P M models have been developed in the 1990s. Among the most widely discussed are the Balanced Scorecard (Kaplan and Norton, 1992) ) the Performance Pyramid (Lynch and Cross, 1991) and the Results and Determinants Framework (RDF) for Performance Measurement in Service Businesses . We will use the RDF to examine information gaps within two PHSs, as it was specifically designed for services, has been argued to be applicable within the Public Sector (Bates and Brignall, 1993; Brignall, 1993) and is the subject of on-going research at this institution.
Recent changes in U.K. and Swedish PHSs
In the U.K. the National Health Service (NHS) is administered centrally by Civil Servants at the Department of Health and the NHS Executive, with a system of Regional Health Authorities (RHAs, recently abolished) and District Health Authorities (DHAs) having local responsibilities. The implementation in 1991 of the 1989 White Paper's ('Working for Patients') purchaser-provider split meant that acute health services were to be supplied by NHS Hospital Trusts and directly managed units (DMUs), DHAs (with some fundholding GPs) being the purchasers. The split requires purchasers and hospital providers to contract for the provision of services, prices being based on full cost (including a six percent real return on their assets' replacement costs), avoiding any cross-subsidization. The assumption is that purchasers will shop around to find the best (cheapest) buy, so promoting cost efficiency and control in the system as a whole, since resources will flow over time to those winning the competitive battle. However, contracts are usually based on the provision of whole specialties at an agreed volume ('block contracts'), reflecting local monopolies of service provision, hence the NHS internal market exhibits imperfect price competition. Furthermore, the crude costing practices used by most providers have meant that prices are unreliable indicators of comparative efficiency (Ellwood 1996) . Not surprisingly, non-price competition (e.g. in type of clinical procedures) is occurring, sometimes as a result of negotiation between providers and purchasers, as foreseen by some commentators (e.g. Bates and Brignall, 1993) .
The imposition of contracting and the infusion of large numbers of managers new to the NHS have alienated many clinical staff, who are reluctant to engage in joint management of the delivery of health services, seeing this as an erosion of the NHSs historical 'clan' culture and their dominant power within it (Bourn and Ezzamel, 1986; Laughlin et al., 1992; Broadbent et al., 1996) . In this context it is useful to note that contract costing should be seen against the background of previous attempts to make the NHS more commercially minded. Examples include the management budgeting and resource management initiatives following the 1983 Griffiths Report, which enjoyed limited success at best (Pollitt et al., 1988; Packwood et al., 1991) . Thus the new emphasis on costing is an attempt to force clinicians to change (cf. Broadbent et al., 199 1)) for improved costing systems are intended to aid cost management, which is the essence of resource management and arguably an essential accompaniment to budgeting. We would agree with Pollitt et al.'s judgement that such changes will only succeed in the NHS '...if...consultants controlled systems in which the emphasis was at least as much on clinical as on cost data.' (pp.
In this confused situation there is a need for a framework, such as the RDF, to make sense of information provision to operational (e.g. clinical) and top manage-23 1-232) ment (whether within the service provider, or at higher levels) and so help prevent an ironic possible over-concentration on costing and rate of return information which contract costing might cause.
In Sweden, the primary responsibility for health care rests with the 23 County Councils, which are subdivided into a number of districts. The accounting and control systems in use in these organizations have undergone a number of reforms over decades. However, these reforms have failed to link control information to the requirements of other stakeholders. For instance, Anell (1990) describes a new chart of accounts which came to be widely used in Swedish healthcare in the early 1970s. Despite attempts to upgrade the system, it does not convey relevant cost information to operating-level managers as it is inadequate for tracing costs to various operating units (e.g. hospital wards) and so diffuses accountability (Anell, 1990; Paulsson, 1993) . The system is inappropriate for pricing decisions, yet it has been increasingly used for pricing following the implementation of purchaser-provider models in several County Councils (Paulsson, 1993; Svarvar, 1997) .
In Sweden the 1980s were characterized by the spread of new techniques, such as management-by-objectives, combined with a gradual shift in control style from centralized planning to devolution of financial responsibility (Anell, 1990; Collin and Hansson, 1993) . However, the effectiveness of management-by-objectives has been questioned by Rombach (1991) . This critique highlights the risk of reinforcing ambiguity and conflict by giving certain (partly conflicting) objectives priority over others, thereby eroding the balance established through political or ideological control (cf. Hofstede, 1981; Brunsson, 1985) . The quest for political legitimacy for reforms has also overshadowed the need to tailor control systems to operating conditions (Czarniawska-Joerges and Jacobsson, 1989; Rombach, 199 1; Paulsson, 1993) . Another sectoral trend is an increasing focus on accounting information for performance evaluation (Paulsson, 1993) ) but the conflict between professionals and administrators concerning accounting information may be less pronounced compared to other countries (Coombs, 1987; Paulsson, 1993 Paulsson, , 1995 . PMSs which better balance the objectives of different stakeholders may help resolve such conflicts.
We conclude that a quest for improved resource utilization, involving enhanced accountability and managerialism, has dominated public health care reforms in both countries (Broadbent et al., 199 1; Humphrey, 199 1; Paulsson, 1993; Lindkvist, 1996) . There has been growing reliance on internal market mechanisms for coordinating resource allocation and a striving to elevate beneficiaries from citizens to 'customers' (Cooper and Rea, 1988; Goddard, 1992; Collin and Hansson, 1993) . However, some notable differences emerge from a comparison of prior research in the two countries. First, divergences in the implementation of reforms may be partly attributable to differences in the structure and funding of public health care. In the U.K. there is tight accountability to the centre from which funding flows but in Sweden funding is raised by regional taxes which are levied and administered directly by each county council. These differences are reflected in the extent to which control systems have been centrally co-ordinated. Recent reforms in the U.K. include nation-wide implementation of purchaser-provider splits, while similar changes in Sweden have been implemented by around half of all County Councils (Charpentier and Samuelson, 1996) . Second, there appear to have been some differences in the extent to which managerialism has been accepted by clinical staff (Coombs, 1987; Paulsson, 1993 Paulsson, , 1995 .
Given the diverging reform paths in the two countries (see above), it is useful to assess what implications these have had for the design of control systems. For instance, has the greater discretion enjoyed by Swedish county councils, which our Swedish case study exemplifies, resulted in greater opportunities to tailor PMSs to local operating conditions? Conversely, what benefits and problems arise from the U.K.s more centralized co-ordination of the implementation of reforms, which our U.K. Trust case illustrates? It is also important to recognize that various types of health services and service process types may give rise to widely differing contextual pre-requisites for the design of PMSs. Hence the rationale for examining different types of services provided by organizations subject to relatively disparate reform paths, which our two case studies exemplify.
As regards performance evaluation, a more comprehensive assessment of the performance of public health care organizations would be achieved by considering a larger diversity of stakeholders, objectives and performance dimensions. This might include indicators of service quality, flexibility and other aspects which are rarely captured by traditional accounting information. This might appear futile given the propensity of some public health care organizations to suppress goal incongruity by allowing the objectives of one or a few stakeholders (e.g. clinicians) to dominate the formulation of organizational goals (Hofstede, 198 1; Rombach, 199 1) . Nevertheless, it may be a necessary step towards untangling complex cause-effect relationships and thereby providing a better foundation for managing the trade-offs between various performance dimensions (Bates and Brignall, 1993; Brignall and Ballantine, 1996; Ovretveit, 1996) . Improving communication through the provision of more integrated and multidimensional performance information may also reduce information asymmetries (Modell, 1997) . Significant information asymmetries may inhibit the application of traditional management control models in health care organizations (cf. Broadbent et al., 1996) ) hence the rationale for examining the issue of performance measurement in health care services in an information management perspective and with a greater emphasis on the influence of operating conditions.
The results and determinants framework
In 199 1 Fitzgerald et al. published their CIMA-funded interdisciplinary case-study research into performance measurement (PM) in 11 large, for-profit U.K. service businesses. Together with their observations from relevant literatures, this research led them to propose a normative model for P M in services, consisting of three main elements: a control model within which P M is sited; a recommended level of organizational analysis for PM; and a range of dimensions for PM.
Recognizing that organizations compete on many other factors than cost and price, Fitzgerald et al. (199 1) suggested six dimensions of performance, split between two which measure the results of an SBUs strategy (competitiveness measures such as market share or sales growth rate, and financial measures such as cost, profit and rate of return) and four dimensions which are the deteminants of that strategy's success (quality, flexibility, resource utilization and innovation). (1991) 12 factors of service quality and three types of service flexibility. There will be interactions and trade-offs between the six dimensions and the factors which underlie them, whose consideration during the process of strategy formulation should lead to better-balanced strategic plans. We argue that these six dimensions form a useful framework against which to compare any healthcare service provider's information system, and the information requirements imposed by purchasers and other powerful interested bodies. However, services are not homogeneous: Silvestro et al. (1992) identified three service process archetypes (see Figure 1) 
The case studies
Using the RDF ) the next section examines the performance measurement and management practices of two PHSs, one based in the U.K. and the other in Sweden. The NHS Hospital Trust provides a diversity of relatively specialized and customized health services and is characterized by complex interdependencies between operating units and several hierarchical levels with significant differentiation. This case is compared with a dental practice under County Council governance in Sweden, with two primary types of operations. A large number of similar and largely self-contained units (district clinics) provide a broad range of relatively standardized services. There are also a smaller number of specialist clinics, each with its own niche in terms of fewer but highly customized services and characterized by greater differentiation and more complex interdependencies with other units. These units resemble the situation in the Trust, but with fewer hierarchical levels.
The two case organizations differ in the extent to which they have been affected by reforms in their countries. Whereas the Trust has been subject to considerable change since the early 1990s) the dental practice has been able to make incremental changes in control practices over several decades and does not operate a purchaser-provider split. This reflects the greater discretion enjoyed by public health care organizations in Sweden in their choice of control systems design and the lesser emphasis on uniform governance structures. We think our cross-case comparisons are insightful as both cases illustrate attempts to devise multidimensional performance measures that link operations and strategy, which in both cases may be analysed using the RDF and the service process type model developed by Silvestro et al. (1992) . The common purpose and shared mode of analysis used in our cross-case comparisons enable us to meaningfully consider the implications of the different reform paths for the design of control systems, and the benefits and problems which have arisen as a result. Others have noted that such cross-case comparisons '... can provide richer interpretations of the research issues through the particular synthesis which the researcher develops to encompass the cases under consideration' (Humphrey and Scapens, 1996, p. 96 ; see also Noblit and Hare, 1988) .
Because we are not comparing like with like, we are not able to draw out those differences between our case sites which are not attributable to their differing reform paths. The heterogeneity of healthcare services will, in any event, make it very difficult to truly compare like with like. However, we argue that our case studies can be used for explanatory purposes, not to draw inferences to a larger population based on sample evidence, but rather through analysis to generalize back to and refine theory (Keating, 1995; Spicer, 1992; Yin, 1984) and to provide ideas for further research.
A U.K. case study: PM and costing within an NHS Hospital Trust
The Trust is situated in the southern part of Northern Ireland and operates from one major general hospital site which has been operating as a provider of acute services since it opened in the early 1970s. The main site offers a full range of inpatient, outpatient and day care services. Two subsidiary hospitals also exist, one of which provides services for the elderly, including day hospital procedures, assessment, rehabilitation, respite and continuing inpatient care. The third site provides key administrative support to the main hospital site, and offers services including outpatient, day and inpatient services for medical, surgical and geriatric patients. The Trust has approximately 600 beds. Over 90 percent of the Trust's work is contracted to one purchaser, the Southern Health and Social Services Board (SHSSB), which is therefore in a monopsonistic position with regard to the Trust, which is the largest of some 20 service providers. Our work with the Trust has involved repeated visits, an extensive study of relevant documentation and the interviewing of over 30 clinical, nursing, administrative and managerial staff; representatives of the SHSSB; and general practitioners (GPs), both fundholding and non-fundholding.
The management directorate structure of the Trust, adopted in 1993, has a number of clinical and managerial directors (e.g. Director of Medicine, Director of Finance), who report directly to the Chief Executive Officer. Clinical directors are of two types: three support services (radiology, pathology, anaesthesia) and three provide medical services (medicine, surgery, obstetrics and gynaecology). Lead consultants and senior nursing managers are responsible for providing clinical services and monitoring patient activity levels. The clinical directorates do not have a business manager, so clinical staff (acting as nursing managers) have responsibilities for which they have received little training. Hence, while growing financial pressure has been a strong driving force behind the devolution of accounting information, this process might be facilitated if appropriate training was provided.
The services provided by the Trust are many and varied, with most staff being employed in front-office activities with relatively high degrees of discretion in their handling of patients. Individual patients may consume different parts of the services on offer, for example, while all in-patients will occupy a bed in a ward some will require X-rays and tests in the pathology lab, while others may not. Thus some services are comparatively standardized and delivered to many patients, whereas others are highly customized and delivered to but a few. In addition, whilst some patients may have a hospital stay of some weeks, others can be treated on an out-or day-patient basis. This therefore means that different services may be placed at different points on the continuum of service process archetypes (see Figure 1 ) which has implications for cost control and PM (Brignall, 1997) .
The Trust currently has a number of unintegrated PMSs which produce financial and non-financial information. The PMSs are used for a variety of purposes including monitoring progress against targets and taking corrective action where deviations are identified, as an aid to the contracting process, and reporting on the financial status of the Trust.
Financial performance information
A range of financial information is produced, including 'average' sub-specialty prices.
However, while the prices are accepted by the SHSSB, contracting is by annual block contracts at whole specialty level, making it difficult for the Trust to forecast sub-specialty activity levels and make plans to meet them, which has detrimental effects on cost control.
A recent development within the Trust has been the development of specialty trading accounts, which should be of interest to clinicians and clinical service managers since they provide a link between activity (throughput volumes, in-patient occupancy rates, in-patient bed capacity and average length of stay) and costs for individual specialties. Specialty accounts are provided alongside the finance board report and should be helpful in more closely monitoring contract activity, so remedying a perceived weakness. Specialty accounts report on budgets, actual expenditure and activity related data, with variances for both month and year to date. Costing reports show the total costs for each specialty, after all allocations from other cost centres, and capital and revenue items, variable, semi-fixed, fixed, direct, indirect and overhead items. In addition, there is a system of responsibility accounting showing actual vs. budget costs for each budget holder, discussed monthly. In recent years budgets have been disaggregated as part of a drive to devolve responsibility, but some clinical budget holders feel they have received insufficient training and have too little say in what goes into the budget. It is too early to say whether the future focus of cost control at the Trust will be at responsibility centre (i.e. at the directorate level) or specialty level.
The mainsprings of internal financial control are the need to stay within the Trust's external financing limit while trying to meet the required six percent real return on the Trust's replacement cost assets, both of which are proving difficult to attain. Given the SHSSB's unwillingness to use the specialty prices, cost control has been primarily effected via the responsibility accounting system; however, because of variations from planned output (primarily overshoots) this has not proved effective. The Trust is operating in a situation where its external environment has changed because of Government action, resulting in increased competition. This has been accompanied by a new requirement to prepare full product costs for the first time, overlaying a pre-existing system of responsibility centre accounting under the so-called Korner returns. However, the crudity of the average costs produced and the fact that the major purchaser, the SHSSB, does not use them when contracting means that the investment in the new product costing system has so far been to little purpose, which clinicians and managers have realized. The result has been a loss of cost control, with the Trust's managers struggling to find links between activity at specialty level and costs at responsibility level.
Integration of financial and non-financial performance measures
Non-financial performance information at the Trust is perhaps inevitably conflated with the need to report both financial and non-financial information upwards, not just to the SHSSB but to the Northern Ireland Health and Personal Social Services Board (a surviving RHA) and the NHS Executive. It is probably fair to say that financial and non-financial performance information are poorly integrated at present, but the recent development of specialty accounts goes some way to remedying this. For example, whilst customer satisfaction with service quality is measured on an ad-hoc basis, to date no attempt has been made to integrate such information with other financial and non-financial information, and the quality surveys are not clearly linked to who should take what action thereafter. When gap analyses are performed between the performance information provided within the Trust's various PMSs (details across the six dimensions available from the authors) and the RDF (see Tables 2 and 3) ) it becomes apparent that, while strategic objectives are present across the six dimensions, specific targets against which progress can be measured are frequently absent. This is particularly so for measures of flexibility and innovation. This lack of targets internally is linked to the lack of external targets: for example, the Regional Strategy for Northern Ireland contains such objectives as 'cost effective service', 'access for family and friends', 'responsive service', 'reduction in bed numbers' and 'shift from inpatient to day and outpatient investigation and treatment', but specific targets are only given for the last two of these (details available from the authors).
In our analysis of the Trust's PMSs, we noted that the measurement and management of performance meant asking (and answering) three fundamental questions:
what has happened? why has it happened? what are we going to do about it?
From our analysis of the PMSs and their use within the Trust, we recognized that the Trust's ability to answer these questions seemed to decline as one went through them; that is, while the PMSs enabled managers and clinicians to see what had happened, much time and effort was expended in trying (not always successfully) to understand the causes, leaving insufficient time to think strategically about how to eliminate the problems in the future (that is, to address question three above).
Non-financial performance information is used to support planning, monitoring and control of the following: the investigation of patient complaints, including legal claims; contracting; quality initiatives; and Patients' Charter requirements (see Table  2 ). Measurement of service quality at the Trust is divorced from other aspects of performance measurement. For example, customer satisfaction surveys are ad hoc, are not integrated with either financial or non-financial measures (e.g. resource utilization such as bed occupancy) and, most importantly, do not involve clear lines of responsibility for action. This lack of system integration, together with poor lines of The lack of system integration has not aided the development of a balanced basket of performance measures. This failure is evident in some of the Trust's internal planning documents, such as its Strategic Direction Statement 1994-99, which recognizes the need for a range of measures but has few clear targets and does not say how balance should be achieved. The overall impression, from our review of relevant documentation and existing PMSs, and our interviews with clinicians and managerial staff, of the current state of information provision within the Trust is that, while some types of information are not present, there is too much information leading to overload. This underlies a statement by the Director of Medical Services when he said 'the way it comes out here it is too much paper-it is so spread out. I would like more summarized reports and then if I want to look more deeply, I can do that'. Conceptually, the biggest problems the Trust faces are in establishing the links between variables across the six dimensions, making strategic decisions as to which trade-offs are acceptable, and then implementing and monitoring plans intended to reflect these decisions: in other words, it has yet to clearly link strategy to operations. The Trust exhibits a dichotomy between the operational focus of most clinicians on meeting patients' service quality needs, with priority given to medical outcomes, and the pressures felt by senior administrative staff via contracting and other forms of external monitoring which focus on financial and activity performance measures. This dichotomy is both reinforced by, and causes a lack of communication within the Trust. This is acknowledged by the CEO, who said 'we have to make best use of the information that we have but obviously we have to find more effective ways of communicating because they don't really work-our means of communicating-neither up or down are effective'.
A Swedish case study: PM and costing within a dental practice
Swedish public dentistry is administered at the county level, but operates within largely independent administrative units in each county. Following funding reform in 1974, public dentistry expanded and now caters for around half of all dental care. In the early 1990s) some county councils initiated far-reaching reforms aiming at implementation of purchaser-provider models or privatization of dental clinics. The organization under study, however, has neither privatized nor adopted a purchaser-provider split. Instead, it has followed a cautious strategy of decentralization and devolved budgeting within the existing governance structure. The case description below draws on an extensive study involving 38 interviews, the review of a large number of internal and external documents and repeated feedback sessions with key informants (see Modell, 1996 , for a more comprehensive methodological discussion).
The site of the case study is a public sector dental practice in the central part of the country with a total staff of around 600. The practice covers just one county and is the only public dental practice within it. Operations depend heavily on front office activities due to the need for close interaction with patients and are highly labour-intensive (around 65 percent of operating costs are labour-related and largely fixed in the short-term). The focus on front office activities is also associated with a significant degree of discretion of employees in charge of these (i.e. dentists and hygienists). The organization is divided into 40 district clinics, 11 specialist clinics and a number of laboratories. District clinics provide a broad spectrum of dental care to both adults and children, generally at regularly recurring intervals, with relatively brief treatment episodes (up to 30 min). District clinics form self-contained operating units, as the only interdependencies with other clinics occur when patients require more specialized types of care. Specialist clinics face relatively complex interdependencies with other units due to the system of referrals, which often results in waiting times of up to several months. However, district clinics are exposed to a varying degree of competition from private dentists, while there is virtually no competition in specialist dentistry.
The services provided by specialist clinics are different from those of district clinics in many respects. In particular, they exhibit a higher degree of customization, treat fewer patients and patients spend longer in the service delivery process, all of which bring them closer to a professional service.
Corporate centre management has kept the clinics small, as this facilitates coordination and reduces the need for time-consuming administration. The average size of district clinics is 12 employees and for specialist clinics six. (By comparison, the Trust employs some 1500 overall, with approximately 420 clinical staff in the medical directorate, 240 in the surgical directorate and 160 in the obstetrics and gynaecology directorate, with the remainder of staff being employed in support and administrative functions.) According to top management, the reason for avoiding complex administrative routines at the operating level is the need to minimize the time employees spend on non-patient-related (non-chargeable) activities. For district clinics, it is also vital to optimize the time spent on treatment of children while securing a high level of quality, so that resources can be shifted to revenue-generating treatment of adults. This creates incentives for delegation of treatment of children to less costly categories of employees so that dentists can concentrate on adults.
Financial performance information
Management control practices for the two types of operations differ considerably. While there is a tradition of measuring and evaluating the performance of district clinics, management has only recently started to implement formal accounting controls in specialist clinics. According to the Chief Controller, the emphasis on budgets and other tools for centralized planning has been replaced by an approach stressing feedback and devolution of financial responsibility in efforts to contain costs. Several district clinic managers also indicated that they now felt more involved in the control process as it was only since budgetary responsibilities were devolved that they had received any 'real feedback' from higher levels. A yearly dialogue between district clinic managers and administrative support staff, to trace variances and assess operating conditions for the coming year, takes place before financial and operating goals are specified.
From 1990, a harsher financial climate led to increasing attention on cost containment, with staff reductions of ten percent and implementation of tighter cost controls, particularly the revenue:cost (R/C) ratio as the dominant measure for performance evaluation in district clinics, such clinics becoming profit centres. The R/C ratio is essentially a break-even measure, although this is rarely achieved for the organization as a whole. Goal levels for the clinics are differentiated with respect to local conditions and may vary between 90 and 120 (where break-even equals 100). Interviewees at all levels stressed that the previously widespread focus on revenues had been replaced by increasing concerns with cost containment since the early 1990s. Top management, as well as internal documents, indicated that the growing pressure to reduce costs was one of the major reasons for the gradual transition from bonus systems, exclusively based on the revenues of individual dentists, to bonuses for all categories of employees based on the R/C ratio of each clinic. At the operating level, the shifting focus was most clearly stressed by one dentist saying that 'the reason for the growing emphasis on costs is that we have reached the limit as far as revenue maximization is concerned. There are also greater concerns with cost items that were not emphasized before, like rent'. The growing cost consciousness within clinics is also reflected by greater efforts to economize on material purchases.
Specialist clinics are cost centres where the budgetary dialogue has been geared towards specific operating results. Managerial responsibilities are specified as a limited number of operational targets (e.g. patient waiting times) within specific cost constraints. Top management and administrative staff have difficulties in setting standards for time utilization and cost per case due to the high degree of customization and unpredictability in the length of treatments. For instance, the Assistant Controller stated that 'while aggregate expenditure levels are largely given, it is far from self-evident how specialists spend the money as patient needs are so varied'. However, specialist clinics have not been exempt from the pressures to reduce costs.
According to the Chief Controller, the use of financial controls in district dentistry is facilitated by the greater certainty regarding resource utilization and revenues, with standardized prices for adults and notional revenues as a fixed sum per fully treated child. Revenues are also disaggregated to the team level by district clinic managers and are used for periodic performance evaluation.
Cost allocation throughout the practice is not difficult as the majority of costs are clinic-specific. Management has been cautious in allocating non-controllable overheads (e.g. depreciation, financial charges and administrative overheads), wishing to avoid distorting cross-clinic comparisons. However, among specialist clinics comparability is difficult, which has contributed to a down-playing of financial controls.
According to several interviewees, comparisons with similar types of specialist dentistry in other parts of the country are also difficult due to the lack of uniform accounting standards.
Integration of financial and non-financial performance measures

District clinics
Extensive yearly performance data are compiled for the district clinics by the practice's controller's department. A tool for systematizing this information was developed in the late 1970s. Today this PMS encompasses over 30 measures (listed in Table 4 ). Some of these measures are also used for monthly and quarterly performance evaluation. These 30 measures are not a nation-wide system, but some information (the epidemiological statistics for children) is compiled for purposes of nation-wide comparisons.
The financial performance of clinics is largely determined by employees' time utilization) which is closely monitored at all levels. Even though the R/C ratio dominates top management's evaluation of district clinics, this is complemented by a large number of time-based indicators) specifying average care time for various categories of patients and employees, in order to trace causes of budgetary variances at year-ends. Revenues from adults and major cost items (e.g. labour) are also related to the total work time of dentists and hygienists. Apart from being compiled at year-ends) the latter measures and a few key indicators of average care for children and adults also complement the R/C ratio in the quarterly feedback to clinics and are used for communication with teams within clinics. This quarterly feedback is complemented with less extensive monthly reports emphasizing aggregate financial data.
Consequently, financial performance information is closely integrated with indicators of resource utilization. Furthermore) the ability to derive short-term performance measures directly from the monthly time, revenue and patient statistic reports received from clinics and aggregate these into the more complete set of measures used for the annual budgetary dialogue reduces the costs of performance evaluation.
The short-term emphasis on financial performance and resource utilization is complemented by a more balanced long-term focus. In particular) formal quality control has a primarily long-term orientation) through the obligation of each clinic to check or treat 95 percent of all children in its district every year, and quality audits based on comprehensive epidemiological statistics for children. This regular surveillance facilitates cost-efficient preventive care. However, quality data for adult patients is sparse (see Table 5 for a gap analysis) and there were frequent references to a need for such information throughout the organization) not least to 'legitimize the organization' vis-h-vis private dentists. However, there were also references to some professional resistance to more elaborate quality controls. One interviewee summed up the problems encountered in this respect by saying that 'the certification of dentists has traditionally been regarded as a sufficient guarantee for quality'. Furthermore) yearly quality information is rather technical) even though a clearly stated objective in the organization's budget/business plan is to 'strive for a high level of patient satisfaction'. Surveys reflecting patients' attitudes are only performed occasie Table 4 Measures used for evaluating the perfomance of district clinics.
Dimensions of performance
Types of measures Specific measures
Financial performance 'Profitability' Revenue/cost ratio (S) Revenue/labour cost ratio (S) Inflation adjusted revenues and costs of treatment (adults)
Competitive performance Measures of Number of regularly treated patients customer base (adults and children) Distribution of adult patients across Service quality Health status Epidemiological statistics for children.
five age groups (%).
Number of treated children in relation to number of children in each district (%)
Flexibility
Volume flexibility Staff composition expressed in terms of: -Dentists (full-time equivalent).
-A ratio based on total work time of all categories of employees. Number of regularly treated patients per dentist (full-time equivalent). Weighted ratio reflecting composition of the clinics clientele in relation to number of dentists (full-time equivalent). for dentists.
Resource utilization
(full-time equivalent).
Average care time (adults) compiled
Number of treatment rooms per dentist Innovation Productivity Average hourly revenue (adults) per dentist (S) Average hourly revenue (adults) per hygienist (S) Total labour costs/ total work time for dentists (S) Total indirect costs/ total work time for dentists (S) Costs of materials (total and as % of work time of dentist) (S) Revenues from ortotechnical works/ care time (adults) compiled for dentists.
N o measures identified, but continuous testing and evaluation of new types of treatment by staff specialist.
(S) denotes that the measure is used for both short and long-term control. efficiency measures as short-term surrogates.
Teams
Requests for more quality information.
Resistance to more elaborate quality control.
County Council
Crude indicators of the effects on quality of (higher levels) cost reductions.
The Social Insurance Board nally and are not integrated with the reports used for periodical evaluation, which employees deprecate as they think they would help to balance the tension associated with the emphasis on short-term financial targets. Another major gap is the poor quality of information about the competitive position of the organization v i s -h i s its private sector competitors, particularly for adult (paying) patients. The competitive position of district clinics is expressed as the number of regularly treated patients which is then compared with demographic data for the whole county. While attention is paid to changes in the number of adult patients across various age groups, these crude measures of competitiveness are not linked to information about the underlying causes of patient switching. However, clinic managers claimed to monitor patient switching behaviours closely by pursuing a constant dialogue with teams regarding the causes of these. This is yet another example of clinic managers compensating for the lack of formal performance indicators by relying on more informal control practices.
The flexibility of clinics is measured by relating staff structure to the number of treated patients and a weighted measure reflecting the treatment needs of the clientele. However, the Chief Controller claimed that changes in staff, particularly the employment of newly graduated dentists, cause considerable evaluation problems when attempting to isolate variances in financial performance due to variations in individual proficiency.
Finally, the organization lacks performance indicators on innovativeness. Although new methods of treatment are tested and evaluated by a specialist, the organization might benefit from some indicators of 'day-to-day' innovativeness of operating-level employees. However, some dentists complained that time pressures hamper their ability to 'experiment' with new methods of treatment.
Despite these gaps, top management considered the PMS to be a valuable tool for tracing causeeeffect relationships and determining trade-offs between various longterm performance dimensions. The development of the PMS over 15 years reflects a gradual learning process, but also the changing focus of control. The instrument was originally designed for operations-orientated control while integration of financial data has followed and supported the increasing emphasis on devolution of financial responsibility via participative budgeting. Hence, quantitative goals at the operating level (the R/C ratio and quality targets) are closely linked to strategic objectives. Financial information also reflects operating conditions and is thereby perceived as less abstract by operating level employees, so facilitating clinic-managers' acceptance and use of the PMS.
Specialist clinics
The measurement of specialist clinic performance is less advanced and more problematic. The lack of easily identifiable financial performance measures, like the R/C ratio, makes performance evaluation emphasize operating statistics and aggregate cost information. T o p management and clinic managers monitor waiting times, patient throughput and the spectrum of treatment requested in referral reports.
According to the RDF, these would be classified as flexibility measures. Few meaningful measures reflecting resource utilization, innovativeness and quality are used for performance evaluation. Information about competitiveness is of less strategic relevance, since clinics do not face competition. While there has been less emphasis than in district clinics on systematic periodic performance evaluation, there is a similar focus on time utilization. Several specialists stated that growing waiting lists resulted in some pressure to 'work harder'. However, top management finds it difficult to trace underlying causes and trade-offs between different performance dimensions. A number of other problems were identified in the gap analysis summarized in Table 6 .
The budget/business plan for the organization as a whole includes few quantifiable objectives for the specialist clinics, which some specialist clinic managers feel disadvantages them regarding resource allocation. However, there were also indications of resistance to more formalized control practices among specialist dentists and clinicmanagers finding operating matters too pressing to devote much time to administrative tasks. This became particularly obvious at one of the feedback sessions, where one specialist clinic manager stated that the steady flow of referrals left 'no room for administration'. Some clinic managers also argued that the smaller size of clinics Limited quantitative information in budgets and plans made informal communication preferable. Further, several specialist clinic employees with administrative tasks (e.g. head nurses) felt that they had received inadequate training for this purpose and found the information received difficult to interpret. For instance, some of them referred to 'the extensive but very uninformative data sheets received once a month'. Clinic-managers thought that recent demands for cost reductions were unrealistic. While top management is attempting to improve the dialogue with specialist clinics, they are also trying to delegate responsibility for co-ordination of interdependencies between district and specialist clinics instead of relying on transfer prices or other formal controls. However, it is doubtful whether this will reduce waiting times, as there appear to be some communication barriers and conflict between district and specialist clinics. Several specialist clinic employees complained that even though district clinics are able to treat some patients (e.g. orthodontics, operations on impacted wisdom teeth) they prefer to refer them to specialist clinics to avoid time-consuming and costly treatment.
Conclusions
Recent public health care reforms in the U.K. and Sweden have reinforced the need for trade-offs in PMS design, which cannot be understood in isolation from the changing strategic priorities that such reforms signal (Donaldson and Lorsch, 1983; Brignall et al., 1992) . New strategic objectives are likely to influence PMS design, as demonstrated by the increased attention to competitiveness in the NHS Trust hospital following the purchaser-provider split. Similarly, in the Swedish dental practice greater attention to financial performance and resource utilization has followed growing demands for cost reductions. Given the need to tailor performance measures to strategy, what additional information is needed for a balanced performance evaluation? Performance measurement frameworks, such as the RDF, can play a key role here. Focusing on the implementation of financial performance measures, the primary service characteristic which influences these is the degree of customization, which is due both to variations in patients' needs and their behaviour as co-producers of services (Larsson and Bowen, 1989; Modell, 1996) . These factors affect comparability between sub-units and the establishment of meaningful standards for resource utilization (e.g. standard costs per case, average hourly revenue) which explain variations in financial performance. The differences in this respect were most obvious in the Swedish dental practice, with district clinics providing services which are more amenable to standardization and consequently financial controls than those of specialist clinics. In the NHS Trust, the presence of multiple specialties which draw, to varying degrees, on common services and which are also interdependent makes the tracing and control of costs very difficult for all specialties. The control of costs is particularly difficult in those specialties where a high proportion of the demand is beyond the control of clinicians: for example, in the medical clinical directorate 90 percent of patient activity is non-discretionary.
While the applicability of financial controls is partly related to managers' ability to assess cause and effect relationships in the service process, we also need to consider differences in the structural complexity of the organizations concerned. Cost traceability is obviously improved by structuring service organizations into small, self-contained operating units as in the Swedish dental practice, but declines as the complexity of interdependencies between units and the number of patients served by each unit increase, as manifested by the NHS Trust hospital . The former type of structure has been advocated as the more suitable design option for services in general (Lowry, 1990) and professional ones in particular (Mills et al., 1983) . However, the typical structure of public health care organizations in several countries appears to be that of large, differentiated entities with complex interdependencies between sub-units (Abernethy and Stoelwinder, 1990; Mia and Goyal, 199 1; Paulsson, 1993) ) as in the NHS Trust. Hence, it is questionable whether efforts to improve control by focusing on financial performance are suited to such organizations and we must look to the non-financial dimensions of the RDF for solutions (Bates and Brignall, 1993) .
It has been argued (Chase and Tansik, 1983 ) that efficiency-based performance evaluation is most appropriate for back office orientated services, while control of front office orientated services should focus on effectiveness goals reflecting how well employees manage to serve customers. Translating this argument into the RDF, we would expect a focus on resource utilization to be most appropriate for various support departments (e.g. laboratories, food services) while evaluation of the performance of front office orientated services, such as those provided by specialties like intensive care units, should rather be geared towards measures of flexibility and quality.
The challenge, then, is to find some systematic manner of managing the trade-offs in the design of PMSs to arrive at a more focused approach to PMS design than the one currently prevailing in many public health care organizations in both the U.K. and Sweden (Charpentier and Samuelson, 1996; Cmnd 8616) ) which may reduce the risks of information overload. The Swedish dental practice has been relatively successful in this respect, considering its originally operations-orientated PMS for district clinics, but has experienced considerable problems when attempting to implement an efficiency-based performance evaluation style for specialist clinics. Similar problems in differentiating PMSs for different types of services have been experienced in the NHS Hospital Trust: strategic priorities such as the National emphasis on waiting lists have driven out the development of tailored operating measures at individual specialty level.
These findings are indicative of the risks of a few strategic priorities, perhaps endorsed by a particular group of stakeholders, becoming too dominant and thereby disrupting the balance between various performance dimensions. Hence, the service perspective on PMS design may be a useful complement to the focus on strategic objectives, as it challenges systems designers to undertake a more thorough analysis of operating conditions.
As illustrated by our case studies, the effectiveness of multidimensional PMSs in health care organizations also depends heavily on the information systems infrastructure in place and the degree of integration between information systems used at various organizational levels. The compartmentalized nature of PMSs in the NHS Trust hospital appears to contribute to duplications of effort, insufficient access to some information and, paradoxically, information overload at the operating level. In contrast, a much closer link between the information used by top management and that forming the basis for periodic performance evaluation by district clinic managers is discernible in the dentist organization and has been supported by the development of local information systems. This facilitates the tracing of cause and effect relationships between various determinants like resource utilization and staff composition, and financial results. This is more difficult in the NHS Trust hospital where quality and flexibility indicators are not integrated with other performance information. Hence, the design of integrated PMSs is likely to influence the dialogue between managers and clinicians and hence the effectiveness of control.
For the future, our sample evidence indicates that in both the U.K. and Sweden there is a tension when trying to balance the provision and use of financial and non-financial information. The future development of costing systems may enable better links to be made between costs and resource utilization (e.g. bed occupancy), but studies of the interactions and trade-offs between activity levels and costs on the one hand, and service quality or flexibility on the other, are in their infancy. Until these links and interactions are better known there may continue to be conflict within service providers between administrators and clinicians, and between service providers and external parties, such as purchasers. In both cases the provision of appropriate, integrated PMSs which meet the contrasting needs of operational level employees and the periodic control needs of top management remains an issue, but a real point of difference between the two cases is that the Swedish site has made greater strides towards adopting a uniform system of performance measurement, while devolving significant responsibilities for monitoring and controlling performance to clinic level. On balance, from the limited evidence presented here, it would appear that the more decentralized approach evident in the Swedish case has led to a more balanced approach to performance measurement than the centralized approach adopted in the U.K. However, some NHS Trusts have been more successful than others in adapting their local PMSs to meet local needs, while satisfying national ones. Here the U.K.s 'corporate centre' (the NHS Executive) might add value (Goold et al., 1994) by sharing information as to best practice PMSs.
